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ESSAY 
ROBERT C. ILLIG* 
Oregon’s Experiment with Sustainable 
Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique 
Over the past three years, Oregon has sought to become a leader in 
sustainable corporate governance.  The effort began around 2007 
under the leadership of Dick Roy and his organization, Oregon 
Lawyers for a Sustainable Future.1  Its basic goal has been to make 
Oregon’s statutory framework more appealing to green businesses.  
Presumably, the sought after result will be to both recruit new green 
businesses to Oregon and encourage existing Oregon businesses to 
improve the sustainability of their operations.  If successful, the effort 
may also serve as an exemplar for other states to follow. 
In pursuit of these goals, the first of two proposed statutory 
amendments was enacted by the Oregon legislature in 2007, while the 
second remains under consideration.  At first glance, they appear to 
be relatively modest steps aimed at clarifying and broadening the 
scope of corporate decision making.  Upon further reflection, 
however, I believe they will have a negative impact on Oregon’s 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.  Portions of this Essay are 
based on a presentation the author made to the Oregon Bar Association’s 2009–2010 
Leadership College. 
1 The author and several of his colleagues at the University of Oregon, both past and 
present, have at times been participants in and supporters of Dick Roy’s efforts.  See 
generally, e.g., Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left:  A Legislator’s Guide to Greening a 
Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491 (2009) (arguing in favor of Roy’s reform agenda).  
Thus, this critique of Oregon’s effort represents a friendly difference of opinion over 
tactics, rather than a serious dispute over ends.  More importantly, it seeks to highlight 
alternative avenues for sustainable corporate law reform that are likely to have a more 
permanent and far-reaching impact than those currently under consideration. 
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economy and ultimately prove to be wrong turns on the path to a 
more sustainable future. 
Under the first proposal, ORS 60.047(2), Oregon corporations are 
now expressly permitted to include in their articles of incorporation a 
provision that would either allow or require the board of directors to 
make decisions in a manner that is environmentally and socially 
responsible.2  The phrase “environmentally and socially responsible” 
is intended to direct the board’s attention to the theory of the triple 
bottom line: businesses should seek to maximize their value with 
respect to “people, profits and place.”3 
The second proposal, H.B. 2829, was tabled in committee in 2009 
and, as of this writing, has never been voted on by the full 
Legislature.4  As a result, its future remains uncertain.  According to 
its language, it appears intended to permit the boards of directors of 
any Oregon corporation, including those that have chosen not to adopt 
the language of ORS 60.047(2)(e), to consider more than just 
shareholder interests when determining corporate policy.5  Rather, the 
corporation’s impact on social, legal, ethical, and environmental 
issues, together with the interests of its employees, customers, and 
suppliers, could all be balanced against the corporation’s fundamental 
policy of shareholder wealth maximization. 
Together, these proposals are firmly rooted in a stakeholder view 
of the corporation.  This theory holds that corporations do not exist 
merely for the benefit of their shareholders, but also for the benefit of 
their other stakeholders, broadly defined.6  It resembles the triple 
bottom line approach, but is in many ways more expansive.  For 
example, it includes the interests of society in general as well as those 
 
2 OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2) (2009) (“The articles of incorporation may set forth . . . 
(e) A provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the 
corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible . . . .”). 
3 See JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST 
CENTURY BUSINESS 2 (1998) (“The sustainability agenda, long understood as an attempt 
to harmonize the traditional financial bottom line with emerging thinking about the 
environmental bottom line, is turning out to be much more complicated than some early 
business enthusiasts imagined.  Increasingly, we think in terms of a ‘triple bottom line,’ 
focusing on economic prosperity, environmental quality and—the element which business 
has tended to overlook—social justice.”). 
4 OR. STATUS REPORT FOR HOUSE MEASURES UPON ADJOURNMENT, June 29, 2009, at 
H-106, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/09reg/pubs/HouseUponAdjournment09.pdf. 
5 See H.B. 2829, 75th Or. Legis. Ass’y, § 1 (2009). 
6 See Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1019–21 (2009). 
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of creditors and future shareholders.  A number of states have modest 
stakeholder-oriented provisions, but Oregon’s is the first in the nation 
to include “directing” language that would become mandatory for 
electing corporations.7 
Overall, I believe that Oregon’s ambition to become a leader in 
green business is both admirable and sensible.  It plays to Oregon’s 
strengths, particularly its progressive and outdoorsy culture, while at 
the same time seeking to harmonize humanity’s relationship with the 
Earth.  Thus, I agree wholeheartedly that Oregon should seek to 
become a leader in the worldwide effort to develop a green economy.8  
That being said, as a corporate law scholar, I find myself deeply 
skeptical about the tactic of attempting such reform through revisions 
to the corporation statute.  I fear that the effort will backfire, both 
failing to achieve its objective and rebounding to Oregon’s detriment.  
Instead, I propose an alternative reform agenda. 
CORPORATE REFORM AS SIGNAL 
My primary concern with the two amendments is that they do not 
appear to change the law.  Both, after all, are permissive rather than 
proscriptive.  Moreover, in Oregon and elsewhere, corporate boards 
of directors already possess the latitude to act in a manner that is 
consistent with the triple bottom line.  All that these provisions do is 
make explicit what has always been implicit. 
The cornerstone of corporate governance is the business judgment 
rule.  This so-called rule is really a presumption that directors, when 
taking action on behalf of the corporation, do so in good faith, with 
due care, and with the honest belief that their actions are in the best 
interests of (or not opposed to) the interests of the corporation.9  The 
idea is that, because business decisions necessarily involve risk 
taking, courts should seek to avoid second-guessing strategies that 
 
7 See id. at 1019–20. 
8 For a recent call to arms and a description of the dangers involved in falling behind, 
see Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Who’s Sleeping Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at 
WK10. 
9 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW §4.1.2, at 278–79 (2000) (“The idea 
underlying the rule is that courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable for (or 
otherwise second guessing) business decisions which produce poor results or with which 
reasonable minds might disagree. . . . [D]irectors frequently must make business decisions 
in situations in which, no matter what decision the directors make, someone is going to 
disagree with what the directors did.”). 
 192 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 189 
prove less than successful.  Rather, courts should focus on the loyalty 
of the directors and the quality of their decision-making processes. 
The business judgment rule therefore creates a broad zone of 
discretion that insulates from challenge board decisions that are made 
carefully and without the taint of self dealing, whether or not they are 
made strictly in the interests of the corporation’s shareholders.  Of 
course, liberal commentators have long complained that such wide 
discretion effectively allows corporate managers to pursue their own 
selfish interests without fear of being held accountable.  However, 
this management-friendly regime allows just as much discretion for 
managers to do good in the name of society’s welfare as to do evil in 
the name of profit.10 
Put differently, managers already have the discretion necessary to 
act in the best interests of the environment and society as well as in 
the interests of their shareholders.  Shareholder wealth maximization, 
though a powerful norm, has never been an absolute rule.11  Rather, 
triple-bottom-line management has always been available to those 
companies brave enough to adopt it. 
However, this raises an interesting question: if the legislative 
changes under consideration in Oregon do not seek to change the law, 
what is their intended purpose?  Is it merely to clarify the law, or 
something more far reaching?  In fact, the goal appears to be 
symbolic.12  The amendments seem to be designed to draw attention 
 
10 See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS 
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 226–28 (2006). 
11 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor, Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. . . . [I]t 
is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a 
corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose 
of benefiting others . . . .”) (emphasis added).  Use of words like “primary” and 
“incidental” suggest that absolute adherence to the shareholder norm constitutes more than 
is required.  See also Sneirson, supra note 1, at 496–97 (“American corporate law permits 
firms to pursue . . . green practices and business plans.  Corporate law contains no 
requirement that fiduciaries maximize shareholder profits or wealth.”). 
12 It has been argued by supporters of the amendments that its real purpose is to clarify 
Oregon’s somewhat inconsistent application of the business judgment rule.  See, e.g., 
Public Hearing on H.B. 2829 Before the H. Comm. on Sustainability and Economic 
Development, 75th Or. Legis. Ass’y (Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of University of Oregon 
Assistant Professor of Law Judd F. Sneirson), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/listn/ 
archive/archive.2009s/HSED-200903241243.ram (“If anything, what it would do is clarify 
the business judgment rule in Oregon . . . . Oregon corporate law on this point is not as 
well settled as in other jurisdictions”).  Even if this interpretation is correct, however, the 
Legislature’s choice in adopting an expressly green reform agenda—when no such choice 
need have been made in order to clarify the law—appears intended to draw attention to the  
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to Oregon and its burgeoning green economy.  Oregon, it appears, is 
seeking to attract green business entrepreneurs by signaling its new 
economy bona fides.13  But is signaling a good idea? 
MIXED SIGNALS 
The problem with signaling as a legislative strategy is that one 
loses control over the signal as soon as it is made.  The signal is 
therefore subject to both misinterpretation and misdirection.  It is this 
latter possibility that I fear will be the true legacy of Oregon’s 
experiment with sustainable corporate governance.  Its intended 
audience may overlook the signal while others inimical to its message 
may receive it a little too loud and clear. 
Realistically, we must admit that the nuances of any state’s 
corporation statute, not to mention its mere existence, are not widely 
understood by the general public, entrepreneurs, or business leaders.  
Moreover, to understand the implication that Oregon’s statute is 
marginally more environmentally friendly than, say, Washington’s or 
Colorado’s would require the observer to know something about all 
three statutes (not to mention the other forty-seven).  At best, the 
proposed change in Oregon law constitutes a very weak signal that is 
unlikely to register strongly outside the corporate law community. 
Even worse, the signal is likely to be weakest among its intended 
audience.  Since the statute does not change current Oregon law, it 
can have no measurable impact on existing local businesses.  Rather, 
its intended audience is presumably out-of-state businesses that are 
considering relocation.  To the extent such businesses remain in their 
start-up or entrepreneurial stage, which at this point most green 
businesses probably do, this sort of weak signal would probably not 
affect their assessment of whether and where to relocate their 
business.  Rather, the quality and education level of the local 
workforce, access to raw materials and new technologies, the 
 
provision and signal the state’s commitment to sustainability.  See id. (statement of Rep. 
Chris Garrett) (“The purpose of this bill is to recognize that corporations are not just profit 
maximizing entities, they are important social actors . . . . This bill would authorize them 
to account for economic, environmental, social, and ethical considerations as well.”). 
13 See, e.g., Governor Ted Kulongoski, State of the State Speech 2009 (January 12, 
2009), available at http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/speech/2009_0112_stateofstate.shtml 
(“There is a green revolution stirring in America, and Oregon is the beating heart of that 
revolution.”). 
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community’s livability, and government tax and other incentives are 
all likely to be far more relevant. 
It would be possible to send a very strong signal were one so 
inclined.  However, it would require real substance—substance that 
policymakers may not be prepared to provide.  For example, Oregon 
could simply eliminate the state income tax on any profits an 
organization earns from selling green technologies.  It is unclear what 
the impact of such a suggestion would be on the state’s finances, nor 
how such a scheme could be made workable.  However, it would be 
certain to send the kind of signal that would attract notice.  Talk, as 
they say, is cheap.  It must be supported by real substance to hold any 
value. 
But does this cheap talk come at a price?  Even if the signal mostly 
misses its mark, what is the harm if it really does not change the law?  
Absent a significant downside, the signal would presumably yield 
success even if only a few entrepreneurs notice. 
The real risk, it turns out, is not misinterpretation but misdirection.  
Anyone reading the amendments will know immediately that they are 
intended to signal Oregon as a progressive, environmentally friendly 
state with a legislature that seeks to promote a green economy.  
Rather, the concern is that the signal, because it is unique among the 
fifty states in promoting sustainable business, will appear overly 
salient to established companies with the legal and other resources 
necessary to stay abreast of legislative change.  The signal, in other 
words, might not seem so weak to companies that already fear that 
Oregon is an inhospitable place to conduct business.14  Indeed, this 
group might even include those firms that seek to profit by 
developing sustainable products and technologies or support the green 
agenda, but are not yet ready to go so far as to change their corporate 
charter.  Signaling, in other words, can be dangerous in that 
policymakers can never be sure of when they have crossed the line, 
accidentally identifying Oregon in the minds of business leaders as a 
hostile environment for all but the purest of green enterprises. 
In normal times and under normal economic circumstances, one 
might argue that this is a reasonable risk.  However, at the time of this 
writing, Oregon’s unemployment rate is one of the highest in the 
 
14 See, e.g., Andy Giegerich, Some Biz Lawyers Worry Over Sustainability Effort, 
PORTLAND BUS. J., Apr. 18, 2008, http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2008/ 
04/21/focus7.html (interviewing lawyers wary of changes to the Oregon corporate code). 
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nation.15  Although some commentators see isolated signs of a 
resurgent economy, much of the improvement has been limited to 
Wall Street and many see the potential for a second dip.16  Economic 
recovery in the near term remains far from certain. 
What Oregon needs is jobs.  Jobs provide dignity and purpose.  
Jobs reduce crime.  They increase tax revenues and generate feelings 
of community and optimism.  Meanwhile, job loss and associated 
poverty have negative impacts on the environment that are at least as 
significant as those resulting from economic growth.17 
Certainly, Oregon needs to move forward aggressively with a pro–
green business agenda, both because it is the right thing to do for the 
world and because it is the smart thing to do for the State’s economy.  
Environmental remediation needs to work symbiotically with 
economic development.  Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a viable 
future without both. 
That being said, policymakers need to be keenly aware of 
initiatives that might weaken one sector of the economy without 
strengthening another.  My concern is that the ongoing effort to 
reform Oregon’s corporation statute risks sending a very antigrowth 
message with the potential to scare off existing businesses without 
being sufficiently encouraging to attract new ones.  Admittedly, this is 
an empirical question that cannot easily be answered ex ante.  
However, there appears to be a real possibility that cheap talk is not 
cheap—it risks damaging the economy without contributing to 
sustainability.  Unless the Legislature is willing to put substance 
behind its signaling, it would be better to leave well enough alone. 
THE PROBLEM OF STATE REGULATORY COMPETITION 
The risks associated with weak signaling would not be so great 
were there not already competition among the states for corporate 
 
15 Richard Read, Oregon Unemployment One of Worst in Nation During 2009, 
OREGONIAN, Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2010/oregon 
_unemployment_one_of_wor.html (noting that, having lost more than 75,000 jobs in 2009, 
Oregon’s 11.1% unemployment rate remains well above the national average). 
16 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., That 1937 Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at 
A21 (arguing that the nation could still experience a second downturn, much like what 
happened in 1937 when governmental efforts to rein in spending led to the deepest and 
most destructive period of the Great Depression). 
17 See LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B 4.0:  MOBILIZING TO SAVE CIVILIZATION 106–10 
(2009). 
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charters.  The story of how Delaware won this competition and 
established itself as the principal seat for a majority of America’s 
public corporations is instructive. 
State regulatory competition began around the turn of the 
nineteenth century when New Jersey cast a jealous eye across the 
Hudson River.  In an effort to share in the commercial activity taking 
place in New York, the New Jersey legislature repealed many of the 
most important restrictions that had, until then, been universally 
imposed on all corporations.18  The result was immediate and 
profound: New Jersey attracted so many businesses as to garner the 
nickname “the Mother of Trusts.”19  Delaware, another small state 
geographically close to the major commercial centers of the 
Northeast, adopted a similar statute but with far less effect.  New 
Jersey had apparently won the hearts and minds of corporate 
America. 
The situation changed, however, when Woodrow Wilson was 
elected governor of New Jersey on a Progressive Era platform of 
reform.  When New Jersey reinstated many of the prior restraints on 
business practice, corporate America took notice and relocated en 
masse to Delaware.20  At this point, regulatory competition among the 
various states took hold in earnest, characterized by what Louis 
Brandeis contemporaneously described as a “race to the bottom.”21  In 
the years that followed, all of the remaining states adopted pro-
business corporation statutes comparable in effect to that of Delaware, 
resulting in a nearly uniform regulatory landscape throughout the 
nation. 
The challenge facing reform-minded state legislatures has therefore 
become how to effect change without driving business away.  Based 
on corporate law’s internal affairs doctrine (which is itself based on 
 
18 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 2.01, at 33 (2d ed. 2003); 
GEVURTZ, supra note 9, § 1.1.3(b), at 21–23 (noting that, prior to this point, most state 
corporation statutes included limitations on their size, duration, and purpose).  For a more 
detailed description of the events leading up to the change, see generally Charles M. 
Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and 
Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323 (2007). 
19 COX & HAZEN, supra note 18, § 2.01, at 33–34. 
20 Id. 
21 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(decrying the development of a race of laxity).  But see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14 (1993) (arguing from the right that the same 
phenomenon should really be understood as a race to the top given the economic upside of 
deregulation). 
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the Constitution’s full faith and credit clause), corporations are free to 
organize wherever they like and still retain the benefits of nationwide 
operations.22  Thus, Oregon’s most important employers can 
reincorporate elsewhere if they perceive, as a result of poorly 
engineered signaling, that Oregon has become hostile to their 
presence.  Although it would be more costly for an Oregon 
corporation to actually relocate its operations than to merely change 
its legal home, the Legislature risks losing control over Oregon’s 
employers in the same manner that New Jersey ceded control to 
Delaware. 
FEDERAL REGULATORY COMPETITION 
There is a bright side to this story, however, and it suggests an 
alternative agenda for corporate reform.  The several states, Delaware 
among them, now find themselves in regulatory competition not with 
one another but with the federal government.  Corporate law, long the 
exclusive preserve of state regulators, is at risk of becoming 
federalized.23 
Again, the story is familiar but worth repeating.  In response to the 
stock market crash that marked the onset of the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt enacted the fundamental architecture of U.S. 
regulation of securities trading.  The structure was intended to 
regulate behavior at the federal level primarily by requiring 
America’s largest corporations to provide ongoing and detailed 
disclosure of their operations.24  For the most part, companies could 
act as they pleased, so long as they were willing to acknowledge their 
behavior publicly.  In practice, however, most preferred to clean up 
their operations rather than admit to less-than-ideal conduct.25 
 
22 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.3(A), at 14–15 
(2002); see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 23.2, 23.9 (4th ed. 
2004). 
23 See generally Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003). 
24 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 38–
39 (4th ed. 2004). 
25 A concrete example of this phenomenon occurred in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirement that public companies “report their conclusions about the effectiveness of 
their internal controls based on their evaluation as of that date.”  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 302(a)(4)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)(D) (2006).  Presumably, affected 
corporations could have simply reported that their internal controls were of sufficient but 
not stellar quality.  However, the near-universal response was to spend millions of dollars  
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Since then, Congress has further federalized corporate law by 
enacting, among others, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in response 
to widespread bribery of foreign officials that was uncovered during 
the 1970s, the Williams Act in response to concern over the abuse of 
shareholders in the context of hostile takeovers, and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in response to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom.  
Meanwhile, as of the date of this writing, both houses of Congress are 
actively debating major economic reform proposals in response to the 
recent crisis.26  History, not to mention contemporary politics, 
suggests that we can expect a continued federalization of the 
regulation of corporations.27 
Given the near uniformity of existing state regulation, the best 
target for sustainable corporate reform may be the federal 
government.  With the Democratic Party currently in control of both 
Congress and the White House, now would seem an opportune time 
for reformers to lobby for new law.  More important, because the 
federal government has power throughout the nation, it is immune to 
most regulatory competition.  Corporations may be able to move from 
state to state, but they cannot easily move from country to country—
at least not if they want continued access to U.S. markets. 
THREE AVENUES OF ATTACK 
The most obvious strategy for corporate reform at the federal level 
is through the extensive disclosure obligations imposed upon most 
large American corporations.  Under section 5 of the Securities Act of 
1933, public companies are subject to continuous disclosure rules.  
The rules essentially require companies to disclose all information 
that is “material” when they have a duty to speak.28  Information is 
 
per company reforming the quality of those controls so that the companies could make 
favorable reports.  See HERBERT S. WANDER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 32–34 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc     
-finalreport.pdf. 
26 See, e.g., David Herszenhorn, Senate, 59–39, Approves New Rules for Wall Street: 
Bill Greatly Expands Oversight by U.S.–Broadly Similar to House Measure, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 2010, at A1. 
27 It would be possible to argue, at the time of this writing, that the election of Scott 
Brown in Massachusetts and other events have fundamentally altered the political 
landscape, making major Democratic-led initiatives less likely.  However, given the 
continued popular anger directed at Wall Street, such changes in the political winds may 
make reform of Wall Street more rather than less likely. 
28 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.9 (6th ed. 2009). 
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deemed material when a reasonable investor would think that it alters 
the total mix of available information.29 
One line of attack, then, would be to argue that existing rules 
require the disclosure of a public corporation’s impact on the 
environment.30  Why?  Because the future value of the corporation’s 
operations could be drastically altered by both the effects of global 
climate change and the environmental risks inherent in the company’s 
specific operations.  For example, most investors would want to know 
about the likelihood of beach erosion and rising sea levels before 
investing in a tropical resort company.  Likewise, an energy company 
that ships only via double-hulled oil tankers might have a lower risk 
of loss than one that ships via single-hulled vessels.  Both of these 
green issues would appear directly relevant to the corporation’s near- 
or medium-term bottom line. 
Pursuant to the securities laws, when a future event is uncertain, its 
materiality becomes a function of the balance between its probability 
and the magnitude of its impact.31  Thus, even under existing rules, 
one might legitimately argue that public companies should already be 
disclosing many of their potential impacts on climate change.32  
Indeed, on January 27, 2010, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) voted along party lines to provide interpretive 
guidance regarding disclosure requirements related to the effects of 
climate change.  The announcement was made in response to a 
petition received by the SEC in 2007, and then renewed under the 
 
29 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). 
30 For a more detailed discussion of this possibility, see generally Thomas Joo, Global 
Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 
(2009). 
31 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (holding that “to fulfill the 
materiality requirement ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the “total mix” of information made available’”) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
32 Note, however, that a recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded that existing disclosure requirements are too narrow to require such disclosure.  
In particular, the GAO looked at the requirement under Regulation S-K Item 103 that 
public companies report on their material legal proceedings.  The GAO then concluded 
that this disclosure requirement was easily circumvented by companies that claim the 
outcomes of any such proceedings are invariably too uncertain to characterize.  ELLEN 
CROCKER ET AL., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE:  
SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF 
INFORMATION 3–6 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf. 
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Obama administration.33  As of this writing, the guidance has not yet 
been released.  However, one might expect it to be similar in many 
respects to the guidance the SEC released in 1998 regarding the 
potential for a Y2K computer meltdown.34 
A second possible strategy for reformers to adopt at the federal 
level would be to focus on environmental change not in terms of 
potential liabilities, but in terms of potential opportunities.  As 
consumers increasingly prefer, and often demand, products and 
services that have neutral or beneficial impacts on the environment, 
investors may increasingly find a company’s response to such 
interests to be material.  Thus, one might argue that a company’s 
annual report regarding management’s discussion and analysis of 
known trends and uncertainties should discuss opportunities for gain 
arising from climate change.35  For example, investors might find it 
material to know whether a given automobile manufacturer has taken 
advantage of possible green marketing opportunities by developing an 
electric or hybrid car.  Presumably, if consumer demand requires 
climate-friendly operations and research and development, then such 
information is potentially already material.  Corporate reformers 
might seek to make this clear through the selective use of lawsuits or 
lobbying. 
Finally, there is a third federal strategy available to reformers that 
would be subtle in its implementation, yet revolutionary in its impact.  
One could attempt to push the SEC to rethink its definition of a 
“reasonable investor.”  Currently, that definition is tied to notions of 
profit maximization: reasonable investors desire to earn a positive 
return on their investment, and little else.36 
In reality, however, investors are people, and people are 
complicated and have a variety of (often conflicting) motives.  
 
33 See Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, No. 4-547, at 13 
(Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf 
(signed by, among others, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and 
Randall Edwards, the Treasurer of the State of Oregon). 
34 See Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and 
Consequences by Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7558, Exchange Act 
Release No. 40,277, 67 SEC Docket 1437 (July 29, 1998). 
35 See Regulation S-K Item 301, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2010). 
36 See Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to Laura 
Unger, Acting Chair, SEC (May 8, 2001) (noting that “the SEC staff takes the view that 
the reasonable investor generally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a 
company’s profitability and financial outlook”), available at http://www.uscc.gov/annual 
_report/2002/app5.pdf. 
 2010] Oregon’s Experiment with Sustainable 201 
Corporate Governance 
Moreover, given recent developments in the political economy, the 
notion of the rational investor has come under attack as never 
before.37  Book after book and study after study declare that investors 
are fundamentally irrational.38  Meanwhile, there continues to be a 
strong socially responsible investor movement.39  Shareholders may 
in reality desire more than pure profits.  They may desire growth in all 
aspects of the triple bottom line.  Certainly, this desire is attested to 
by the success of companies such as Whole Foods Markets and Ben 
& Jerry’s ice cream, as well as more traditional companies like 
General Electric and Wal-Mart, each of which seeks (or at least 
claims to seek) to balance profits with the social good.40 
Proponents of deep, structural reform might therefore consider 
focusing their efforts on the long-term goal of expanding our 
understanding of the reasonable investor.  Under such a reimagined 
definition, a reasonable investor might want to know more about a 
corporation than its potential profits and pitfalls.  He or she might also 
want to know about its impacts on the environment and its treatment 
of employees.  Required disclosure, then, would necessarily 
encompass a great deal more than what is currently reported.  
Pushback from corporate America over such a proposal would 
without question be both strong and inevitable, but the potential 
upside for reformers would be profound.  If a reasonable investor 
were deemed to care about more than mere profits, that one simple 
change would revolutionize our understanding of the obligations of 
our largest companies. 
 
37 Even such champions of our market economy as Richard Posner have been forced to 
publicly question the underlying theory of our markets.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, A 
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 2, 107 
(2009). 
38 One example of this phenomenon is the rise of behavioral economics and the related 
development of a cottage industry of popular books seeking to educate the public about 
our brains’ faulty logic.  See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN 
FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); ORI BRAFMAN & ROM BRAFMAN, SWAY: 
THE IRRESISTIBLE PULL OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 
(2008). 
39 SOC. INV. FORUM, 2007 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), available at 
http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/SRI_Trends_ExecSummary_2007.pdf. 
40 See, e.g., BEN COHEN & JERRY GREENFIELD, BEN & JERRY’S DOUBLE-DIP: HOW TO 
RUN A VALUES-LED BUSINESS AND MAKE MONEY, TOO 47 (1998). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Essay is not intended to challenge or delay the general reform 
agenda put forth by Oregon Lawyers for a Sustainable Future and 
similar organizations in other states.  Current economic and 
environmental conditions both point to the need for a new approach to 
business.  However, this Essay is intended to question the tactic of 
relying on a very weak signal to achieve reform.  Signaling is a 
dangerous sport, as one loses control of the signal as soon as it is 
commenced, and it is frequently received either too loudly or not at 
all.  As a result, signals are subject to the twin risks of 
misinterpretation and misdelivery.  Moreover, in a political economy 
that is characterized by regulatory competition and a race to the 
bottom, Oregon’s legislature should approach any attempts to reform 
its corporation statute with a high degree of caution. 
Instead, I have suggested that a better target of reformist zeal is the 
federal system of securities regulation.  Targeted lawsuits could seek 
to establish the notion that corporations have failed in their disclosure 
obligations by failing to comment on the potential impact of climate 
change.  Likewise, the SEC could be subject to lobbying efforts 
aimed at generating further guidance as to how existing rules should 
be (re)interpreted.  Although this might prove more difficult than 
attempting to influence the lawmaking process at the state level, it is 
much more likely to have a lasting impact on our overall regulatory 
structure and business culture. 
My goal is not to advocate for any particular strategy, but to 
suggest a series of avenues that might be more productive in 
advancing a triple-bottom-line agenda.  How and whether each might 
be achieved, and what their exact implications are, I leave to those on 
the front lines of reform.  However, it seems clear that the activities of 
high-profile and sometimes nonobvious opinion leaders such as Al 
Gore, Oprah Winfrey, and countless others have begun to put the 
issue of climate change front and center on the national agenda, as 
well as in the hearts and minds of everyday consumers.41  Change is 
coming, but it will come more rapidly and with better effect for both 
Oregon and the nation if we approach it with due care and 
thoughtfulness. 
 
 
41 See Robert C. Illig, Al Gore, Oprah, and Silicon Valley: Bringing Main Street and 
Corporate America into the Environmental Movement, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223 
passim (2008). 
